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Abstract 
This study uses simulations to explore the possibility of halving the percentage of 
people living in extreme poverty in Africa by 2015. It is shown that initial levels of 
inequality and per capita consumption determine the cumulative growth and 
inequality reductions required to achieve the target. The study finds that on average 
Africa only needs a relatively modest annual rate of growth in per capita household 
consumption to halve poverty by 2015 if inequality remains unchanged. The trade-off 
between growth and changes in inequality varies greatly among countries and their 
policy-choices are thus quite different. In some cases small changes in income-
distribution can have a large effect on poverty, while in others a strong focus on 
growth is the only viable option. 
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1. Introduction 
The international community has formulated Millennium Development Goals to be 
reached by 2015. The first of these goals (MDG1) is that the proportion of people 
with an income less than $1/day shall be reduced to half of what it was in 1990. From 
1990 to 2001 the headcount-ratio of poverty for all LDCs fell from 27.9% to 21.1%, 
but for Africa it actually increased from 44.6% to 46.4% (Chen and Ravallion, 
2004).1 It is not surprising then that several recent studies (e.g. UNDP, 2003, 
Naschold, 2004) have argued that most African countries will fail to reach the target.2  
 
The change in poverty for a given rate of economic growth defines the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to growth, which depends on the level of the poverty line, per-
capita income or consumption expenditure, and its distribution among the population 
(Kakwani, 1993; Datt and Ravallion, 1992). Although it varies with the level of 
economic development and income-distribution (Bourguignon, 2002, 2004), for 
simplicity, most studies have used a constant elasticity of poverty with respect to 
growth. Exceptions are Chen and Ravallion (1998), who demonstrated that the 
elasticity of poverty varies with regard to such initial conditions as level of poverty 
and income inequality. They also showed that countries with high initial poverty and 
inequality require higher rates of growth to meet the MDG1. This study examines 
these insights regarding the determinants of the elasticity of poverty to assess the 
challenge of achieving MDG1 in Africa. Specifically, the study examines the validity 
of the widely accepted view that a very high growth rate of GDP (7% and above) is 
required to reach MDG1 for most countries in Africa, and whether the recent 
resurgence of growth in African economies might be a reason for some optimism. In 
addition, the study considers how the effectiveness for distributional policies to 
achieve poverty reduction varies with initial conditions. We show that the attainment 
of MDG1 is very much dependent on the income/inequality trade-off in each country, 
which varies with the initial level of both income and inequality, consistent with 
previous findings. Focusing on growth alone might not generally be the best way to 
halve poverty by 2015, since a slight decline in inequality might lead to a substantial 
                                                 
1 These estimates are based on nationally representative household surveys in 97 countries.  
2 The studies largely extrapolated linearly from data on poverty-changes over short periods. Most used 
estimates of the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth as the basis for extrapolation. 
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decline in poverty in some cases. Thus it is necessary to study and understand the 
growth-inequality-poverty nexus empirically.  
 
This paper finds that on average Africa only needs a relatively modest annual rate of 
growth in per capita household consumption to reach MDG1 if inequality remains 
unchanged. Also, if current growth rates are maintained, nearly half of the countries in 
our sample can even afford some increase in inequality and still be able to reduce 
poverty by half in 2015. In light of this the paper argues that the difficulty African 
economies have had in sustaining positive per capita income growth rates is a key 
problem when it comes to reaching MDG1 in Africa. 
 
The next section explains the analytical framework used, while Section 3 briefly 
describes the data sources, poverty lines and estimating-equations. Section 4 discusses 
the results. Section 5 presents some of the challenges in meeting MDG1 in the African 
context, and Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Analytical Framework 
Since the statement of the International Development Goals by the OECD in the mid-
1990s, several studies have used the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth to 
evaluate the growth required to halve poverty by 2015 (Demery and Walton, 1998; 
ECA, 1999; Hanmer and Naschold, 1999, 2000). 
 
Any poverty measure can be defined over per capita income and a measure of 
income-inequality (Kakwani, 1993; Ravallion, 1992), and there are a few different 
approaches available to estimate the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth. One 
is an econometric approach, where data on poverty, inequality, and per capita income 
are used to generate elasticity coefficients from a regression of the log of poverty on 
logs of per capita income and a measure of inequality, often the Gini coefficient. This 
approach is frequently used (e.g., Ali and Thorbecke, 2000; Fosu, 2006) in cross-
country studies, where data on poverty and inequality are not available for more than 
one period in a given country. Another approach is simply to use the ratio of change 
in poverty to change in income over a given period as a measure of the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to growth (e.g., Ravallion, 2001). In the absence of data on 
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poverty and growth spells, it is possible to decompose changes in a poverty-measure 
into growth and inequality components based on the characteristics of the Lorenz 
function (e.g., Kakwani, 1993; Datt and Ravallion, 1992; Bourguignon, 2002; and 
Kraay, 2004). The data-requirement for this approach is minimal (one-period 
information on inequality is sufficient). That is, it is possible to construct growth 
requirements to reach MDG1 using Lorenz parameters under the assumption that 
growth remains distributional neutral over the target period and work out the 
implications of changes in inequality on the growth requirement to meet MDG1. This 
approach does not require assuming constant elasticity of poverty with respect to 
growth over the target period, which generally overstates the amount of growth 
required to reach MDG1. In addition, with an appropriate transformation of Lorenz 
functions, it is possible to establish a one to one relationship between the growth and 
reduction in inequality required to attain a target level of poverty. The discussions 
below about the possibility of achieving MDG1 in Africa are based mainly on the last 
mentioned approach, since for most African countries the data available on inequality 
is limited to one period. But some results based on the other approach are also 
reported, both to gain further insights about the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
growth and to check the robustness of the reported values.   
 
Following Kakwani (1993) and Datt (1998), we use the Lorenz function as the basic 
building block for analyzing the growth rate required to halve poverty3 by 2015. It has 
the following properties: 
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L is the share of the bottom p percent of the population in aggregate consumption and 
π is a vector of parameters of the Lorenz curve estimable from a specific functional 
form that characterize income distribution. P is a poverty measure obtained from the 
                                                 
3 We use the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) indices of poverty, which among suggested in the 
literature, meet most of the desirable properties. See Hagenaars (1987) for an excellent review of the 
literature on the measurement of poverty.  
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slope of the Lorenz curve at poverty line z and per capita income μ, and parameters of 
the Lorenz function. There are two frequently used functional forms to capture Lorenz 
curves: the General Quadratic Lorenz function (Villasenor and Arnold, 1989) and the 
Beta Lorenz function (Kakwani, 1980) for which there is a widely available freeware 
(POVCAL)4 to estimate the underlying parameters and poverty indices commonly 
used in the development literature (see also Datt, 1998 for further details ). Once the 
parameters of the Lorenz function are estimated it is possible to use established results 
to compute the amount of growth required to reach MDG1 without changes in income 
distribution, and alternatively the amount of reduction in inequality needed to reach 
MDG1 without growth. To operationalize this, we use the well-known result that the 
slope of the Lorenz curve at the poverty line z and per capita income μ0 is: 
 
0
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which thus implies that: 
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At half of P0, the Lorenz function would be: 
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Thus, to compute the per capita income level μ* consistent with poverty level 0.5*P0 
without a change in the Lorenz curve, one only needs to use equation (3) and (4) such 
that: 
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4 www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms/tools/povcal
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Since the LHS of equation (5) and the numerator on the RHS are known parameters, it 
is possible to compute the cumulative growth required to reach MDG1 by 2015 
assuming that the Lorenz curve remains unchanged. Analogously, we can evaluate the 
amount of inequality reduction required to meet MDG1 if growth does not occur at 
all. Following Kakwani (1993), we know that the slope of the Lorenz curve at which 
poverty is half its original level without a change in mean per capita income must 
satisfy the condition: 
 
00 /)2/'*( μzPL =           (6) 
 
In addition, (6) can be rewritten as: 
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Using equations (6) and (7), we can solve for λ, which is proportional change in the 
Gini index needed for a certain growth rate β. Actually, equation (6) and (7) can 
generate a set of per capita income and Gini values consistent with headcount ratio at 
half of the original poverty level, which may be seen as coordinates of an iso-poverty 
curve (e.g. Bigsten and Shimeles, 2003, ECLAC et al, 2002).  For a given λ, it can be 
shown that the Gini coefficient of the new Lorenz curve is given by: 
 
)()1()( * YGYG λ−=          (8) 
 
where G(Y) is the original Gini coefficient (observed from the data), which is defined 
over a vector Y representing the structure of income (ranked from the poorest to the 
richest), and Y* is a vector that represents the simulated income distribution consistent 
with poverty level at the MDG target poverty level. The relations between β and λ 
then form the core of the growth-inequality nexus to meet MDG1. The set up given in 
equations (6) and (7) allows for the consideration of several scenarios to reach 
MDG1. Apart from the extremes, one can, for instance, work out the rate of change in 
the Gini-coefficient required to meet MDG1 if the economy follows a historical 
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growth trend up to 2015. Or alternatively it is possible to compute the growth rate 
required to reach MDG1 in spite of a certain deterioration of income distribution.  
 
It should also be noted that the relationship between poverty, inequality, and per 
capita income is not linear. Therefore it is not admissible to hold the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to either income or the Gini coefficient constant. Following Datt 
(1998), both elasticities vary with the parameters of the Lorenz curve and poverty 
levels.  To show this, we may rewrite equation (1b) as follows: 
 
))(,/( πμ GzPP =         (9) 
 
where G(π) is Gini coefficient, which is a function of the parameters of the Lorenz 
function. Totally differentiating P with respect to μ and G, and rearranging we get: 
 
dP P d P G dG
P P G P G
μ μ
μ μ
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂        (10a) 
 
Setting 
 
P
P μ
μ∂
∂ =ε, 
P G
G P
∂
∂ =θ, 
 
we can rewrite equation (10a) as follows: 
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where ε is the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth and θ is the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to the Gini-coefficient. We can also introduce the concept of iso-
poverty function (the rate of change in inequality required to keep poverty constant 
for a 1% change in per capita income) if we set the change in poverty equal to zero in 
equation (10b).  
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ν proxies the “growth-inequality” trade-off for small changes around the original 
poverty level.  
 
For the headcount ratio, ε and θ can be computed from the Lorenz function as follows 
(e.g. Datt, 1998): 
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It is clear from equation (10) that the rate of change in the headcount ratio following a  
percentage change in per capita income and the Gini-coefficient is a non-linear 
function of the parameters of the Lorenz function and level of poverty.5 Thus, to make 
simulations on the relative roles of growth and distribution to meet MDG1 equations 
(6) and (7) are the most appropriate, since they implicitly address the variability of the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita income and inequality. This is our main 
approach. However to examine the extent of growth-inequality-trade-off at the 
original poverty level, it is possible to use equation (10b) and we report some of the 
results for selected African countries to get some insight on current role of income 
distribution.  
 
3. Data and Estimation Methods 
The paucity of data on poverty and income distribution has been a major constraint on 
empirical poverty analysis in Africa. Ideally, poverty data should come directly from 
household budget surveys, but in most cases only grouped distributional data are 
available compelling the analyst to use of per capita income or consumption data from 
sources in the national accounts. Certainly this may introduce a serious bias in the 
                                                 
5  We may note that  
)('
)('1
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estimation of poverty as well as relevant elasticities.6 Until complete data that is 
comparable over time and across countries is available, we will not be able to get the 
full picture on the growth-inequality-poverty nexus in Africa.  
 
In this study, we attempted to use nearly all official data available on income 
distribution and per capita income to examine the growth-inequality-poverty nexus. 
We relied much on distributional as well as per capita consumption data which the 
World Bank compiled for its WDI (2004).7 This data is constructed for a subset of 31 
African countries primarily to get an aggregate picture of poverty by sub-region 
during 1981-2001 with substantial imputations for missing data. In most cases 
available distribution data and growth rates on per capita household final consumption 
were applied to obtain the parameters of the Lorenz function. We used slopes of the 
Lorenz functions to generate the implied per capita consumption expenditure for some 
of the regressions we reported in the Appendix. It appears that per capita household 
consumption expenditure from budget surveys was used where possible. So there is 
reason to believe that the poverty figures are comparable over time and to a certain 
extent across countries. We complemented the analysis using distributional data from 
WIDER,8 and per capita household final consumption from national accounts.9    The 
headcount ratio for $1/day/person is used to generate the coefficients of the iso-
poverty functions specified in equations (6) and (7) to compare with results from the 
WDI (2004) data. In addition, this data was also used to compute the “growth-equity” 
trade off at the original poverty level to complement results based on equation (11). 
The relevant elasticities ε, θ (discussed in the previous section) were generated using  
POVCAL software. 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
Table 1 reports two scenarios to attain MDG1 in Africa. One is a neutral growth 
scenario where income distribution is held constant until 2015, and the other scenario 
shows the reduction in inequality needed to meet MDG1 if growth is stalled at zero. 
                                                 
6 See Ravallion (2002) for an elegant demonstration of the seriousness of the problem of combining 
data from household surveys and national accounts.  
7 This data is available from the external website of the World Bank at  
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp 
8 This data set can be downloaded from http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm  
9 Per capita household final consumption data were all in constant 2000 PPP  and obtained from WDI, 
2006) 
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These two scenarios span the range of pro-poor growth patterns discussed in the 
recent literature (e.g. Bigsten and Shimeles, 2003; Kakwani and Pernia 2000; White 
and Anderson, 2000). Intermediate cases also provide useful and realistic insights on 
the growth-inequality-poverty nexus. The results, based on WDI (2004) data indicate 
that the average growth rate in per capita consumption required to meet MDG1 with a 
neutral pattern of growth is around 2.1%, while the median is slightly lower (1.9%), 
with notable variation across countries, from a high of 4.9% for Central African 
Republic to a low of 0.7% for Morocco and South Africa. Considering a long-term 
average population growth rate of around 2.4% (WDI, 2006), the growth in 
consumption expenditure needed is about 4.5%.  
 
“Table 1 about here” 
 
Alternatively, Table (2), which is based on the WIDER distributional data set and per 
capita household final consumption expenditure from national accounts, provides a 
lower rate of per capita consumption growth required (1.7%), mainly due to 
differences in per capita consumption expenditure used and reference period.  These 
estimates referred mainly to data from the early and mid-1990s, and thus ignored 
growth episodes in latter periods.10 We may note that both data sets generate some 
counter-intuitive poverty figures, such as those for Ghana using the WIDER data set, 
where extreme poverty plummeted in a span of few years.  However, in terms of 
summary statistics for the key variables, the two data sets provided comparable 
figures. In the WIDER data set countries such as Mali and Ethiopia would need a very 
high rate of per capita growth in consumption expenditure (4.8% and 4.2%, 
respectively) to reach MDG1 without a change in inequality, while Northern African 
countries such as Tunisia and Algeria needed a very low rate of growth (0.8%) to 
meet the MDGs.  Thus, in terms of broad characterisation of African economies, the 
two data sets have much in common. The results from both data sets clearly indicate 
that by holding inequality at its current level, most African countries would be able to 
achieve MDG1 with relatively modest (but sustained) growth rates. 
 
“Table 2 about here” 
                                                 
10 Also, the sub-samples in both data sets are slightly different.  
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If countries cannot achieve the required growth rates, then poverty reduction is in 
principle possible through reduction in inequality. However, it is hard to pursue 
redistribution policies in a stagnating or shrinking economy than in a growing one so 
the feasibility of this route must to be serious considered.  Still, it may anyway be 
interesting to see the order of magnitude in the reduction of inequality needed to 
reduce extreme poverty by half in 2015 in stagnant economy. From Table 1 we 
observe that Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, South-Africa and Swaziland would need 
only a five percent decline in the Gini coefficient up to 2015 to reduce poverty by 
half. Similarly, countries such as Algeria, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Namibia 
and South Africa need the same small change in inequality to reduce poverty by half 
in the absence of growth according to Table 2. On average, a 14 percentage point 
decline in the Gini is needed to meet the MDG1 target without growth in Africa. 
Thus, since it is hard to envision the policy packages that would bring about this kind 
of dramatic decline in inequality without negative growth effects, growth still seems 
to be critical for reaching MDG1.  
 
So the redistribution scenario on its own certainly may not provide useful insight into 
the challenge of meeting MDGs in Africa. If however we combine the ratio of growth 
required under a neutral growth scenario with the inequality reduction needed without 
growth to meet MDG1, we have what might be considered the “growth-inequality” 
trade-off (or slope of the iso-poverty curve at the intercept).11 This makes it possible 
to get a sense of what happens to the required growth in case inequality rises in the 
run up to 2015. Figure 1 illustrates this point for the WDI (2004) data set where 
countries such as Swaziland (8%), South-Africa (6%), Tunisia (6%), Namibia (6%), 
Algeria (5%), Morocco (5%), Botswana (4%) and Lesotho (4%) need a very high rate 
of additional growth in per capita consumption to meet MDGs if the Gini coefficient 
rises by just 1% until 2015. Thus, rising inequality is indeed very costly for these 
countries. Conversely, the cost in terms of increased growth requirements of rising 
inequality is not so dramatic for countries such as Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda and 
Madagascar. Thus, for such countries the focus for a poverty reduction policy should 
                                                 
11 The iso-poverty curve is non-linear by construction depending largely on initial poverty level and 
curvature of the Lorenz function.  
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be on growth. This seems to be the most efficient way of achieving MDG1, even if 
the growth there is combined with some increase in inequality. 
 
“Figure 1 about here” 
 
We found the same feature based on elasticities of poverty with respect to both 
growth and inequality as depicted in equation (11) using the WIDER data set. By 
taking the ratio of elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita consumption and the 
Gini-coefficient as a proxy for the slope of an iso-poverty curve at the original 
poverty level (see equation 10c). Appendix Table 1 reports the growth-inequality 
“trade-off” for 21 African countries. It might be easier to reduce poverty (to move to a 
“higher” iso-poverty curve) through growth in some cases, while in others through 
reduction of inequality. There might be a range of desirable combinations of pro-
growth and inequality-reduction policies, depending on the country and its 
circumstances.  
 
An interesting scenario to consider is what would happen to MDG1 if recent growth 
performance (1999-2000) were to remain unchanged until 2015. According to Figure 
2, about 8 countries from a sub-sample of 31 had a negative per capita consumption 
growth in recent periods. Certainly, for these countries, completely unrealistic 
reductions in inequality would be needed to meet MDG1. On the other hand, more 
than half of the countries in the sub-sample have actually had a per capita growth rate 
higher than the one required under the neutral growth scenario, suggesting the 
possibility that these countries indeed even can afford some rise in inequality until 
2015 and still reduce poverty by half. A few countries have a growth rate lower than 
that required under neutral growth so that they require some reduction in inequality (at 
unchanged growth rates) to meet MDG1 in 2015.  
 
“Figure 2 about here” 
 
The preceding paragraphs summarized the key results following the simulations of the 
changes in growth and inequality needed to reach MDG1 by 2015 in Africa. It would 
also be useful to reflect on  the determinants of the rates of growth and reduction in 
inequality required to meet MDG1. As shown in Section 2 above, the growth required 
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to reach MDG1 is a complex function of initial poverty, inequality, per capita 
consumption, as well as the poverty line. So it is possible to find some anomalies in 
the growth-inequality-poverty nexus. There are some instances where poverty 
declined in the face of economic contraction (for instance Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Mauritania)12 and others where it increased during economic expansion (Lesotho)13. 
In general however, as depicted in Figures 3 and 4, the growth required to reach 
MDG1 rises with initial inequality and falls with initial income, confirming findings 
reported in Chen and Ravallion (1998). 
 
“Figure 3 about here” 
“Figure 4 about here” 
 
Differences in initial conditions provide some useful characterizations on the relative 
roles of growth and redistribution in meeting MDG1. Richer economies with high 
inequality can reduce poverty significantly through a slight decline in income 
inequality, while poorer countries generally need to focus more on growth than on 
redistribution. However, if such countries in addition exhibit high inequality, efforts 
to use growth policies while ignoring distributional concerns may be politically 
infeasible. Therefore, countries with low initial income and high income-inequality 
will be hard pressed to reach the MDG1 target, since they face the double challenge of 
trying to achieve fast growth and to contain income inequality.  
   
5. The Sustainability of Growth and Persistence of Poverty 
There is abundant empirical research trying to explain Africa’s poor economic 
performance. A wide range of factors have been identified ranging from 
macroeconomic instability (caused by external or domestic shocks) to a set of initial 
conditions, such as geography (Sachs and Warner, 1997); ethnic fractionalisation and 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998); ‘bad’ policies (Sachs and Warner, 1997; 
Easterly, 2000); poor governance (Barro, 1997); weak institutions (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2003; Rodrik et al, 2002); and low human capital. Recently, 
Sachs et al. (2004) have argued that there are three types of poverty traps in Africa: 
                                                 
12 See Table 2 
13 See also Easterly (2000) for such types of episodes in Africa. 
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the savings trap, the demographic trap, and the low capital-threshold trap. Thus Africa 
seems to suffer from many deep-seated, structural problems that propagate poverty 
and which make it hard for African countries to attain high growth rates and once they 
are attained to sustain them over extended periods of time (Collier and O’Connell, 
2004). 
 
The fact that most countries in Africa need only a rather modest per capita income 
growth rate to reach MDG1 with inequality held constant, and that quite a few 
counties have registered growth rates over certain periods that would allow them meet 
the MDGs even with some degree of increase inequality, it seems reasonable to focus 
attention on the sustainability of growth. A recent study on growth dynamics for 
developing countries (Berethelemy, 2006) reported that of the 49 African countries 
covered in this study, only five countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Tunisia and 
Seychelles) registered multiple peaks (equilibrium points) at a growth rate in per 
capita income exceeding of 3.5% during a period of fifty years. A few others (16 
African countries) had only one such equilibrium after the initial per capita income, 
and most of the remaining ones only experienced growth cycles, with incomes 
essentially stagnating around the initial values. It is obvious that the nature of growth 
dynamics in each country determines whether or not the required growth to meet 
MDG1 is feasible.   
 
Since our data on poverty and inequality has been generated in most cases from very 
few time periods, it is not possible for us to distinguish whether these figures are 
consistent with a certain equilibrium per capita income. Nor can we say whether they 
are generated by shocks or, if so, how much of such shocks persist for a long time. 
Still, we attempted to use the cross-country data compiled for WDI (2004) to examine 
if poverty rates for the sample countries exhibit some degree of persistence. As 
reported in Appendix Table 2, the current growth rate of the headcount ratio is indeed 
affected by lagged values of poverty itself (true state dependence), and growth rates in 
lagged values of per capita consumption expenditure and the Gini-coefficient. Our 
statistical test confirms that the instruments used to estimate the coefficients of lagged 
 13
 
 
values are valid, and there are no serial correlation problems in our estimation.14 This 
result it at least consistent with the notion that there is poverty persistence in Africa. 
 
Islam and Shimeles (2006) examined whether poverty is state dependent at the 
household level in rural as well as urban Ethiopia based on panel data for 1994-2004. 
Their results indicated a clear state dependence after controlling for such factors as 
unobserved individual unobserved effects and serially correlated shocks (errors). The 
implication is that once pushed into poverty due to short-lived shocks, households in 
Ethiopia continue to experience poverty due to the fact of being once in poverty in the 
past. That is poverty propagates itself. Therefore, to sustain aggregate growth and 
reduce poverty, policies need not only to take care of the chronic component of 
poverty but also protect households from shocks that push them into poverty.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the challenge of halving poverty by 2015 in Africa using 
available data on per capita consumption expenditure and its distribution. A 
distribution-neutral growth scenario was compared with different pro-poor growth 
scenarios, where reduction in inequality was considered as one possible measure to 
reach MDG1. The results suggest that with a modest but sustained growth in per 
capita consumption expenditure and unchanged inequality, most countries in Africa 
can achieve the target of reducing poverty by half. If recent growth rates in per capita 
consumption can be sustained until 2015, more than half of the countries in our 
sample, most of which are in SSA, will reach MDG1. It was also shown that the 
growth-redistribution mix needed to reach the target depends on initial poverty and 
inequality. Poorer countries, with relatively lower initial inequality need to accelerate 
growth to reach the MDGs, while countries with high initial inequality can go very far 
with small changes in inequality. 
 
The recent resurgence of African growth following the commodity boom suggests that 
per capita income growth may even be higher than what we have seen in the period 
analysed here. A key policy concern will then be what the distributional consequences 
of this resource-based growth will be. Typically the immediate distributional 
                                                 
14 We used Generalized Methods of Moments to estimate equation (1) in Appendix Table 2.  
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consequences of this type of growth have been less favourable for the poor, at the 
same time as African economies generally are unable or unwilling to pursue 
redistribution policies. Moreover, so far African economies have often failed to 
sustain growth over extended periods of time. The ability of countries to maintain 
stability and to deal with shocks and their persistence will be crucial for their chances 
of halving poverty by 2015. 
 
Future research should include changes in the structure of the economy and 
composition of household income to determine the sources of growth and inequality. 
Micro-simulations can be used to analyse how investments in physical and human 
capital, for example, contribute to growth and income inequality, and thus to poverty. 
In Africa, such analyses have so far been constrained in many countries by lack of 
household or individual data on living standards. Recent household-budget surveys, 
for example the Living Standard Measurement Surveys of the World Bank, provide a 
basis for a deeper analysis of the challenges of achieving Millennium Development 
Goals in Africa.  
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Table 1: Intercepts of iso-poverty functions for selected African countries: mean 1981-2001 based on WDI 
data set. 
Country Gini 
coefficient 
in 2001 
Head count 
at 1$ a day 
in 2001 
Per capita 
consumption 
in 2001 (1993 
PPP) 
Annual growth 
rate in per capita 
consumption  
required to halve 
poverty without 
change in 
inequality (%) 
Annual reduction 
in Gini required 
to halve poverty 
without growth 
(%) 
Counterfactual 
Gini coefficient 
in 2015 
consistent with 
reducing poverty 
by half without 
growth 
Algeria 35.45 1.37 1695.89 1.02 0.20 33.81 
Botswana 66.42 22.07 1999.96 2.36 0.53 57.57 
Burkina Faso 46.84 48.69 716.48 2.68 1.85 21.21 
Burundi 42.41 57.57 431.07 2.05 2.13 18.08 
Cameroon 61.33 17.09 1057.75 1.32 0.64 38.20 
Central Africa 
Rep. 
44.58 64.44 490.66 4.94 2.37 21.61 
Cote d'Ivoire 43.74 16.75 1007.86 0.84 0.36 40.56 
Egypt 34.41 3.01 1025.55 0.50 0.27 32.24 
Ethiopia 30.00 23.10 606.44 1.09 1.02 22.19 
Gambia 50.23 21.97 1219.75 1.86 0.61 43.07 
Ghana 40.71 47.46 510.27 1.94 1.66 23.27 
Kenya 44.95 29.82 794.49 1.86 0.77 36.84 
Lesotho 63.16 39.01 1219.42 3.40 0.84 50.76 
Madagascar 47.45 61.02 276.18 0.98 3.29 26.69 
Malawi 50.03 49.66 600.35 2.23 1.49 30.23 
Mali 50.49 64.25 443.09 3.62 2.94 6.35 
Mauritania 39.03 21.90 832.87 1.91 1.19 25.84 
Morocco 39.50 0.53 1984.19 0.66 0.13 38.22 
Mozambique 39.61 33.70 632.87 1.58 1.21 27.50 
Namibia 74.33 32.88 1056.42 2.40 0.41 68.07 
Niger 50.61 64.71 362.99 2.85 2.14 24.52 
Nigeria 5.06 69.92 385.62 3.43 3.14 0.18 
Rwanda 28.90 28.45 569.10 1.06 1.27 20.00 
Senegal 41.28 15.12 954.53 1.80 0.92 31.15 
South Africa 57.77 10.67 2356.56 0.67 0.10 56.53 
Swaziland 60.45 8.47 3121.34 1.73 0.22 57.26 
Tanzania 59.01 50.45 700.12 3.41 1.24 40.76 
Tunisia 40.94 0.27 2837.93 0.76 0.12 39.79 
Uganda 43.11 84.31 256.64 4.44 1.79 33.45 
Zambia 52.59 63.32 432.67 4.03 2.49 16.89 
Zimbabwe 50.12 58.17 503.35 2.33 1.65 29.38 
Mean 46.27 35.81 1002.66 2.12 1.26 31.85 
Median 44.95 32.88 716.48 1.91 1.20 32.23 
Source: Computations based on WDI (2004) 
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  Table 2: Intercepts of iso-poverty functions for selected African countries based on WIDER data set 
Country Year Gini 
(%) 
Headcount: 
at 1 $ a  
day per 
 person in  
2000 PPP 
 
Per capita  
Consump-
tion in 
2000 PPP 
Annual 
growth  
required  
to meet 
MDGs  
without 
increase in 
inequality 
(%) 
Annual  
reduction  
in inequality  
required to 
meet MDG1 
without  
growth (%) 
Counterfactual  
Gini in 2015  
consistent with 
achievement of 
MDG1 without  
growth  
Algeria 1988 39 2 1767 0.95 0.21 37 
Algeria 1995 35 1 1766 0.81 0.19 34 
Botswana 1985 54 23 1287 1.32 0.40 48 
Botswana 1986 54 19 1460 1.21 0.32 49 
Burkina Faso 1994 48 66 438 3.01 5.55 15 
Burundi 1992 33 26 649 1.16 1.13 26 
Cote d'Ivoire 1985 41 18 988 1.02 0.47 36 
Cote d'Ivoire 1986 39 22 620 0.52 0.63 32 
Cote d'Ivoire 1987 40 24 797 0.96 0.64 33 
Cote d'Ivoire 1988 37 21 796 1.06 0.71 30 
Cote d'Ivoire 1993 37 21 773 1.14 0.81 31 
Ethiopia 1995 40 90 235 4.24 ** ** 
Gambia, The 1991 56 33 1011 3.11 1.07 43 
Gambia, The 1992 48 19 1079 1.65 0.64 41 
Ghana 1987 35 22 736 1.11 0.83 28 
Ghana 1988 36 22 736 1.15 0.85 28 
Ghana 1989 37 20 792 1.06 0.71 30 
Ghana 1992 34 5 1079 0.63 0.29 32 
Ghana 1993 34 4 1079 0.36 0.17 33 
Ghana 1997 33 4 983 0.50 0.27 31 
Kenya 1992 54 26 1203 1.82 0.60 47 
Kenya 1994 58 15 1259 0.32 0.13 56 
Lesotho 1986 56 20 1648 1.58 0.34 51 
Lesotho 1987 56 20 1648 1.63 0.35 51 
Lesotho 1993 58 21 2658 0.92 0.13 56 
Madagascar 1993 43 41 602 1.93 1.91 28 
Mali 1989 37 73 320 2.29 ** ** 
Mali 1994 51 77 325 4.80 ** ** 
Mauritania 1988 43 51 440 2.07 4.07 14 
Mauritania 1993 50 30 854 1.45 0.84 42 
Mauritania 1995 39 22 797 1.54 1.00 32 
Mozambique 1996 40 39 583 1.89 2.11 26 
Namibia 1993 74 32 2462 2.35 0.31 69 
Senegal 1991 54 56 552 2.98 2.82 27 
Senegal 1994 41 41 590 1.75 1.90 28 
South Africa 1993 62 9 3992 1.32 0.11 61 
 20
 Tanzania 1991 59 55 628 3.46 2.36 33 
Tanzania 1993 38 30 666 1.40 1.25 29 
Tunisia 1990 40 1 2364 0.82 0.13 39 
Uganda 1989 33 27 628 0.90 0.97 26 
Uganda 1992 41 34 666 1.40 1.23 31 
Uganda 1993 39 30 666 1.43 1.27 30 
Zambia 1991 44 30 764 1.51 1.01 34 
Zambia 1993 46 37 749 2.66 1.57 33 
Zambia 1996 50 54 539 3.28 3.49 25 
Zimbabwe 1990 57 28 1243 1.28 0.43 51 
Average  45 30 1042 1.65 1.1 32 
Median  41 25 794 1.40 0.7 33 
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 Figure 1: Growth-inequality trade-off for selected 
African countries
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 Figure 2: Actual per capita consumption growth vs 
neutral growth required to reach MDGs
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Figure 3: Annual growth rate required to halve poverty and initial Gini 
(1981)
r = 0.4
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Figure 4: Per capita consumption growth required to halve poverty without a 
change in inequality and initial per capita consumption  
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 Appendix Table 1: Equity-growth ‘trade-off’ for selected African countries 
Country Year ε θ ν* 
 
Gini coefficient 
Botswana  1993 -1.03 3.4 3.30 67.4 
Burundi 1992 -1.1 0.26 0.24 42.5 
CAR 1993 -0.45 0.15 0.33 61.3 
Cote d'Ivoire  1993 -2.5 7.1 2.84 45.5 
Ethiopia  1995 -2.7 1.8 0.67 30.1 
Ghana  1997 -1.5 1.6 1.07 40.2 
Kenya 1994 -2 2.4 1.20 42.4 
Lesotho  1993 -0.77 2.1 2.73 62.3 
Madagascar  1993 -0.74 0.18 0.24 48.2 
Mali  1994 -0.52 0.007 0.01 50.5 
Mauritania  1995 -1.7 1.8 1.06 39.6 
Mozambique  1996 -1.6 0.94 0.59 40.6 
Namibia 1993 -0.72 3.7 5.14 77.0 
Niger 1995 -0.64 0.07 0.11 50.5 
Nigeria 1997 -1 0.66 0.66 51.7 
Rwanda  1995 -2.2 2.5 1.14 45.5 
Senegal  1994 -1.98 2.7 1.36 41.8 
South Africa  1993 -2.4 13.1 5.46 58.2 
Tanzania  1993 -1.4 0.74 0.53 38.2 
Zambia  1996 -0.76 0.13 0.17 53 
Zimbabwe  1990 -0.8 0.4 0.50 50 
*Elasticity ratio between growth and change inequality needed to keep poverty constant at 1 dollar a 
day per person.  . 
 
Appendix Table 2: Persistence of  poverty based on WDI (2004) Panel data 
Dependent Variables Growth rate in  headcount 
ratio ( ) ith
  
Constant -.015 
(-1.45) 
Growth rate in lag of  headcount( ) 1−ith 0.545 (3.85)** 
Δ (growth rate in the lag of household final consumption per capita 
from national accounts) 
1−ithfc 1.125 (2.73)** 
Δ (growth rate in the lag of  Gini coefficient) 1−itg -0.983 (-4.03)** 
R2  
Sargan’s Over Identification Test (p-value) 0.4548 
Number of observations 166 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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